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Topic: Comments on session 1 and introduction to session
Conf: Session 2, Msg: 3819
From: Andreas Troumbis (atro@aegean.gr)
Date: 07/04/2003 09:57 AM
Comments on session 1 and introduction to session Andreas Troumbis andreas atro@aegean.gr
SUBJECT: Comments on session 1 and introduction to session 2
AUTHOR: Andreas Troumbis
DATE: 7th April 2003
KEYWORDS: Valuation, utilitarian argument, Biophilia, biodiversity functionality.
SUMMARY: The author discusses why the flaws of the philosophical structure of the valuation system for biodiversity used by modern scientists were made obvious during the first session of the e-conference, and addresses the issue of the utilitarian argument when conserving biodiversity. Finally the author discusses the term biophilia and its implications for biodiversity conservation.
Although not directly addressed or explicitly formulated, the ‘utilitarian argument’ for biodiversity preservation was at the heart of the debate during the first week of the e-conference. This was the immediate consequence of the fact that we tried to link ‘biodiversity’, i.e. an inherent attribute and quality of life, to the concept of ‘biotic resource’ that introduces the dimension of use and of benefit for humans. I am not sure that the debate explored the potential and limitations of this specific link, but I am convinced that it was successful in revealing fundamental flaws and shortcomings in the philosophical structure of the valuation system for biodiversity adopted by modern scientists. The striking element is that although the question of valuation of ‘life’ sensu lato has been central to civilisation since its earliest steps, modern science introduces concepts and systems apparently uncoupled from longstanding philosophical solutions to the deepest introspection of human beings. However, the question of valuation of ‘life’ is indivisible from the question of Ethos, Paideiai and conscience. It has been addressed, within our western tradition, from classic philosophers and early Christian theologians to 20th century humanists. It is worth remembering that the Logos of natural scientists to study the living world, in the typical Bacon-ian tradition, was oriented towards its severe exploitation in favour of humans.
Having the above in mind, I will try to present some critical points regarding the debate of last week, in an attempt to appeal in favour of embodying or connecting the theoretical discourse on biodiversity values in the fundamental philosophical debate.
From this point of view, the debate on ‘potential and risks’ of biotic resources was flagged by two strong positions:
1. An attempt to ‘compare’ the various values and benefits of preserving biodiversity on a moral ground;
2. A rejection of the idea of conserving only those elements of biodiversity that humans identify as procuring tangible biological resources.
It is interesting to notice that almost all contributors agreed on the second point. However there are significant divergences regarding the first point, mostly at the level of the method used and the differences in perceiving the utilitarian argument. It is widely accepted that the values of biodiversity are of scientific, aesthetic, ethical, economic and utilitarian order. Ethical values are related to the belief that humans have a moral responsibility to be stewards of the natural environment and protect all species. Aesthetic values are related to the idea that landscapes and wild species provide amenity to the public. Both ‘build’ the immaterial human ‘bond’ with biodiversity that has been eloquently described by Allan Watt. On the other side, economic values are important as known species, as well as yet unidentified ones, may provide valuable food, fiber, drugs or other products for human use. Is it worth, in our post-modern society, comparing and grading these value systems? I believe that this is strategically wrong from the point of view of biodiversity preservation. Firstly, because we do need a large spectrum of values to reach and attract the various human groups that are motivated by different interests. Secondly, because if we indeed try to put these value systems on a scale, we will inevitably face the question of criteria used for that purpose. On a moral ground, economic or utilitarian arguments may appear ‘distasteful and dangerous’, as Martin Sharman pointed out. On a cynical business or politician’s ground, ‘human bond’ may appear parochial and stupid…
Besides the methodological problem, confusion smoulders regarding the utilitarian argument: it seems that it is perceived as a synonym of economic values of species. That is totally wrong. The utilitarian argument is related to the ecosystem integrity and the functional role of biodiversity. Diversity must be maintained in order to preserve critical ecosystem services and the integrity of the Earth’s life-support system. In our real world, where the environmental problem sensu lato is socially constructed as a mixture of uncertain scientific evidence, ‘low’ and/or ‘high’ level politics, ideology and variation –in time, space and social resolution- culture, aesthetic and ethical arguments are either accepted as overriding principles or discarded as unimportant. The utilitarian argument, properly presented, could be convincing to large parts of the society and could make biodiversity a much higher priority issue than it currently is. To make it strong there is one prerequisite: demonstrate the quantitative relation between losses of biodiversity and losses of function.
Special attention should be paid regarding Wilson’s concept of ‘biophilia’. It is a good example of philosophical discontinuity that potentially creates more problems than those it supposes to address. Biophilia comes from the greek Bios, life, and filia, propitious inclination towards something. Consequently, it is supposed to mean ‘love for the living world’. However, there are problems with the word and the concept.
Firstly, the semantic inadequacy of the term: the word filia has a totally different connotation according to its place in composite words. When filia is used as a prefix, it gives to the word a positive meaning: e.g. philo-sophy, philo-logy, philo-patry etc. On the contrary, when used at the end of the word, it gives a rather negative connotation: e.g. hemo-philia, pedo-philia etc. Anyway, very few can claim being able to reach T. More’s perfection with Utopia. Furthermore, since the early centuries AD, the word Zoe has semantically replaced Bios, because it powerfully merges the concepts of ‘life’ and ‘existence’. Bios is limited to anthropocentric connotations: e.g. bio-graphy or … biotic resources. Although I consider ‘biophilia’ as a non-necessary concept, at least we should replace it by ‘philozoia’. It is like ‘automobile’: obviously this thing should be called either ‘ipso-mobile’ or ‘auto-cinete’, but in this case it was just an illiterate engineer who suggested the word…
Secondly, I always wonder about the need to coin supposedly new concepts, a process that inherently contains risks of erroneous structure and of discontinuity with philosophical treatments that certainly cover its supposed domain of applicability. Major philosophers have formulated the spirit of ‘Philo-zoia’, in an admirable way, as the essence of conscience. Remember Donne, Humbold, Jaeger… But mostly remember A. Schwaizer who defined the object of conscience as the understanding that ‘I’ am life who wants to live surrounded by life who wants to live. The affirmation of life is a spiritual act of man who starts to respect life giving it its real value. But, then he feels the need to manifest the same respect to any other desire for life, (man, animals, plants etc) and therefore he reaches the absolute principle of moral and the essential axiom of conscientious thinking.
Thirdly, ‘biophilia’ is expected to have a certain success among a restricted and informed scientific community since it builds upon a successful scientific construct, that is biodiversity, aiming at rejuvenating the ‘traditional’ discourse on nature, life and environment. But, is introversion what we really need? In our effort to propagate the message for biodiversity preservation we should use a common conceptual platform with other disciplines and the general public. If I have to choose between Schwaizer’s conscience and Wilson’s biophilia, no doubt exists in my mind. I will always teach my students the ‘Theory of Island Biogeography’ as long as I do this job, but I will always speak to my children about conscience. They will understand…
In the second session of this e-conference, we will be considering how science can benefit from or contribute to local knowledge, ethnobiology and local culture, and how biodiversity science can contribute to technological approaches, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), fair and equitable access and benefit sharing.
Looking forward to your contributions on these issues.
Andreas Troumbis (E-Conference chair)
Biodiversity Conservation Laboratory
University of the Aegean